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As I left for work one crisp, sunny, April morning, I spotted a five-by-seven
printed form on my car's front windshield. The form's message proclaimed, in
large, bold letters, "youparklikeanasshole." The form had a checklist of
infractions like "two spots, one car," "that's a compact?" and "over the painted
lines. The bottom of the printed form said,
Parking is far too limited in our overcrowded streets and parking
lots, and you happened to park like an asshole. Go to the above web
site to see why someone else thought you parked like an asshole.
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1. YOUPARKLIKEANASSHOLE.COM, http://www.youparklikeanasshole.com/files/notice-1.
pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2010).
2. Id.
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Don't be too offended, we all do it one time or another-it just so
happens you got caught.3
My next-door neighbor, who evidently put the note on my car, listed my
infraction as "others" with a follow-up explanation written by hand: "You are
parking too close to my garage. It's hard for me to pull my truck in." I studied
the note for a few moments. I felt my heart start to pound and my whole body
became uncomfortably warm. I wadded the note and tossed it. I was angry.
When I arrived at work twenty minutes later, I was still angry. I told my co-
workers about the note. They all agreed with me; it was rude and
inappropriate.
When I returned home that evening, I visited with neighbors who were not
complaining about my parking. I showed them the note, now crumpled and
dirty. They, too, became angry. One neighbor suggested exacting revenge on
the note's author by letting the air out of his tires. Another neighbor excitedly
suggested something involving Crisco. Although I am a trained mediator, I
became giddy about the prospect of getting even. Perhaps it was a moment of
self-reflection that led me to question why I was even thinking of revenge. But
that written demand evoked intense emotions in me and in my neighbors. We
did not care about investigating appropriate responses or attempting to resolve
the problem; we wanted to make my neighbor pay for his rude behavior.
Instead of encouraging me to change my behavior in the way my neighbor
requested, the note had an entirely different effect. The written demand
prompted me to make my neighbor regret placing that note on my windshield.
This incident led me to question the legal demand letters lawyers write. I
wondered if demand letters often evoke similar negative emotional reactions in
their recipients. And, if so, do those emotions influence the recipients'
behaviors in ways that hinder settlement?
Lawyers routinely begin legal negotiations with a written demand letter4 and
a wealth of multidisciplinary, empirical research exists to assist lawyers as they
negotiate on behalf of their clients.5 However, the application of this empirical
research to the written demand letter is largely absent from mediation and
negotiation texts. Instead, these texts focus almost exclusively on face-to-face
3. Id.
4. See Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas 0. Main, The Integration of Law and Fact in an
Uncharted Parallel Procedural Universe, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1981, 2002-03 (2004)
(discussing the trend in civil litigation of sending a demand letter to the opposing party before
commencing litigation).
5. See infra notes 25-54 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & DANNY ERTEL, GETTING READY TO NEGOTIATE: THE
GETTING TO YES WORKBOOK 76-85 (1995) (failing to mention written forms of negotiation);
JAY FOLBERG & DWIGHT GOLANN, LAWYER NEGOTIATION: THEORY, PRACTICE & LAW 203-19
(2006) (incorporating interdisciplinary empirical research throughout while devoting only
seventeen pages to written e-mail negotiation); GARY GOODPASTER, A GUIDE TO NEGOTIATION
AND MEDIATION 167-80 (1997) (failing to mention demand letters even in a chapter entitled
"Negotiation Preparation and Planning"); I JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
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negotiations.7 Lawyers and law students seeking guidance on how to
§ 3.2, at 51 (3d ed. 2005) (warning negotiators to "carefully consider their words in order to
convey the intended message" and to "concentrate upon what is being verbally communicated"
while also acknowledging "the importance of nonverbal communication," but defining nonverbal
communication to include "facial expressions, hand gestures, posture, and eye contact");
RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND STRATEGY (2009) (failing to mention written
negotiation generally, and the demand letter in particular); CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL.,
NEGOTIATION: PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING (2006) [hereinafter MENKEL-MEADOW ET
AL., PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING] (incorporating interdisciplinary empirical research
throughout while ignoring written negotiation and demand letters); MELISSA L. NELKEN,
NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 39 (2d ed. 2007) (including a section on "Opening
Offers/Demands," but making no mention of a demand letter); Janice Nadler & Donna
Shestowsky, Negotiation, Information Technology, and the Problem of the Faceless Other, in
NEGOTIATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 145-46 (Leigh L. Thompson ed., 2006) (noting that
"[t]raditional approaches to research on negotiation do not typically consider the possibility that
the type of communication media used by negotiators could be a factor affecting the negotiation
itself' and discussing the effects of the pervasive use of e-mail and other information technology
on the bargaining process, though failing to recognize written negotiations); see also Subrin &
Main, supra note 4, at 2022 (noting that until recently, demand-letter writing was not mentioned
in civil procedure texts). But see Bret Rappaport, A Shot Across the Bow: How to Write an
Effective Demand Letter, 5 J. OF THE ASS'N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 32, 35 (2008)
(urging an approach to writing the demand letter that incorporates some of the principles of
negotiation theory). However, as this Article argues, this hard-to-find advice is based on intuition
and speculation. No systematic attempt has been made to study or test the effects of the demand
letter. Some authors advise against starting negotiations in writing. See CHARLES B. CRAVER,
SKILLS & VALUES: LEGAL NEGOTIATING 180-81 (2009) (discussing the problems with e-mail
negotiations); MARK K. SCHEONFIELD & RICK M. SCHOENFIELD, LEGAL NEGOTIATIONS:
GETTING MAXIMUM RESULTS 356-57 (1988) (pointing out the disadvantages to using letters and
other written communications in negotiations).
7. See Nadler & Shestowsky, supra note 6, at 145 (noting that, traditionally, researchers
focused on face-to-face negotiations). Many of the titles suggest a focus on "talk only"
negotiations. See, e.g., DEBORAH M. KOLB ET AL., WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF
MEDIATORS (1994); J. ANDERSON LITTLE, MAKING MONEY TALK: How TO MEDIATE INSURED
CLAIMS AND OTHER MONETARY DISPUTES (2007); Phillip Glenn & Lawrence Susskind, How
Talk Works: Studying Negotiation Interaction, 26 NEGOTIATION J. 117, 118 (2010)
("[N]egotiations and mediations succeed or fail based in large part on how participants manage
their talk."); see also FISHER & ERTEL, supra note 6 (failing to mention written forms of
negotiation, and instead including a chapter entitled "Communication: Am I Ready to Listen and
Talk Effectively?"). Carrie Menkel-Meadow includes the same examples of negotiation in two of
her books. One is a lengthy letter from a college student to her parents informing them that she
received poor grades. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE
ADVERSARIAL MODEL 137-38 (2005) (citing ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 15-16 (1993)) [hereinafter MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE
RESOLUTION]; MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 6, at
80-81 (citing ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 15-16
(1993)). The second is a lengthy written advertisement used by the New Haven Railroad during
World War II entitled "The Kid." MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra, at
139; MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 6, at 82.
Although both are examples of the power written documents can have on their readers, Menkel-
Meadow includes them in a section entitled "Talking Persuasively." See MENKEL-MEADOW ET
AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra, at 136; MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM
SOLVING, supra note 6, at xii, 78. Neither book advises lawyers how to successfully negotiate in
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effectively write a demand letter must look to legal writing texts. But the
advice these texts provide lacks a connection to the multidisciplinary,
empirical research that is so important in the mediation and negotiation
context.9 This disconnect may serve as an impediment to quicker, more
favorable settlements. In fact, the untested advice in legal writing texts could
have the opposite effect, causing protracted litigation and less favorable
negotiations.
Based on the empirical research available, this Article argues that the current
advice on how to write demand letters probably hinders, rather than facilitates,
settlement. Of course, to determine what kind of demand letter is most
effective in bringing about a more favorable settlement, the advice and
methods must be empirically tested.'0 Only then will lawyers know whether
their initial demand letters ultimately help or hurt the opportunity for
settlement.
Part I of this Article describes the current state of research in the legal-
negotiation arena and argues that this well-supported and well-accepted
research has all but ignored the written demand. Part II argues that the demand
letter is one of the most important documents a lawyer writes because it often
initiates negotiations, and that various psychological processes involved at the
outset of a negotiation can significantly affect the negotiation's success. Part II
goes on to identify some of these psychological processes, including framing
and anchoring, and connects these processes to the written demand. Part III
discusses how the demand letter provides the lawyer with the opportunity to
tell the client's narrative, persuasively integrating law and fact in a way that is
often hindered by procedural roadblocks once a lawsuit is filed. Several states
now require parties to send demand letters before filing suit." These demand
letters not only set the stage for negotiation, but they also can limit a plaintiffs
relief or prevent recovery altogether.
writing, though they acknowledge examples of powerfully written documents. See MENKEL-
MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra, at 136-39; MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL.,
PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 6, at 80-82.
8. See infra Part III.B.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 284-86.
10. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of a
Theory, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 905, 929 (1983) ("[W]e must systematically engage in
hypothesis building and testing and we must explore our assumptions and generalizations about
negotiations with all the variables and sophistication of the behavior scientist."); Michael J. Saks,
Turning Practice into Progress: Better Lawyering Through Experimentation, 66 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 801, 801-02 (1991) ("A major part of the problem is that the legal profession has no
systematic methodology for producing knowledge about its task or about how well it is
accomplishing that task.").
I1. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1782(a)(2) (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A,
§ 9(3) (West 2006); see also Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2010-11 (noting that a few state
consumer-rights laws and federal environmental laws require demand letters).
110 [Vol. 60: 107
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Part III focuses on one particular area of psychological research-priming.
The research in priming demonstrates the power of the written word to drive
behaviors.12 After discussing this research, this Article uses the priming
studies to hypothesize that the demand letter may actually hinder rather than
facilitate settlement. Research in priming could assist attempts at persuading
others to enter negotiations with the optimal mindset for cooperative
negotiation.
The Article concludes by urging those in the relevant fields-negotiation,
alternative-dispute resolution, and legal writing, among others-not only to
recognize the importance of the demand letter, but also to integrate the demand
letter into the thriving cross-disciplinary research that touches on legal
negotiation.
I. COMMON, WELL-ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES INFORM FACE-TO-FACE LEGAL
NEGOTIATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
By now the legal community has come to understand the importance of legal
negotiation and mediation. The evidence is undeniable-very few cases reach
trial.' 3  One reason to favor early settlement is the overwhelming cost of
litigation in the United States. Those wishing to reform our litigation process
point out not just the cost to particular litigants, but the ancillary costs as
well. The expense of litigation strikes fear in some defendants and may
deprive plaintiffs of their day in court.16 Litigation expenses include not only
the attorney's hourly fees, but also court costs, depositions, and expert fees.' 7
Litigation often ties up a company's resources and causes reduced
12. See infra text accompanying notes 214-27.
13. See Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil
Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 1 (1999) ("Fewer than five percent of all civil cases filed
will result in a verdict; most of the rest will be resolved by negotiation." (internal citation
omitted)); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: What the Numbers Tell Us, What They May
Mean, 10 DisP. RESOL. MAG. 3, 3 (2004) (estimating that 1.8% of cases are disposed of through
trial); see also Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and
Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 281, 293 (2006) ("Only a very small percentage of
cases actually go to trial ... .); Margo Schlanger, What We Know and What We Should Know
About American Trial Trends, 2006 J. DIsP. RESOL. 35, 36 (2006) (noting a reduction in the
number of civil trials before district courts).
14. John Bronsteen, Some Thoughts About the Economics of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1129, 1133 (2009).
15. Seeid atll32-33.
16. See Kenneth F. Dunham, Is Mediation the New Equity?, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 87, 88
(2007) ("The modern legal system has evolved into a place where justice may be difficult to
obtain unless the litigant is financially well off."); Thomas 0. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U.
CIN. L. REV. 329, 333-34 (2005).
17. THE CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, CONTAINING LEGAL COSTS: ADR STRATEGIES FOR
CORPORATIONS, LAW FIRMS & GOVERNMENT 1 (Ericka S. Fine & Elizabeth Plapinger eds.,
1988); see David M. Trubeck et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72,
91-92 (1983).
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productivity.'8 Litigants have come to know, and empirical studies have
shown, that parties are probably better off settling than going to trial.
Beyond the litigants themselves, litigation drains government resources and
decreases funds available for other important functions, such as education. 20it
follows that, the more contentious the litigation, the more costly the trial and
the greater the drain on public resources.21
The realization that lawyers rarely take their cases to trial has shifted focus.22
Perhaps because of this realization, law schools are offering more classes and
clinical opportunities in negotiation and mediation to supplement their
offerings in trial advocacy 23 because the skills and strategies required to settle
legal disputes often collide with the skills and strategies required to win a
trial.24
A. Growth ofResearch in Legal Negotiation and Dispute Resolution
Law school curricula have swelled with course offerings in legal negotiation
and alternative-dispute resolution.25 Likewise, practitioners and courts have
18. THE CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, supra note 17 ("Extensive discovery, pretrial maneuvering,
long trials, and uncertainty over legal outcomes also waste management time and energy, destroy
business relationships, and result in lost market opportunities.").
19. Randall L. Kiser et al.; Let's Not Make a Deal: An Empirical Study of Decision Making
in Unsuccessful Settlement Negotiations, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 551, 590 (2008).
20. Bronsteen, supra note 14, at 1133.
21. See id. (discussing the drain on public resources that litigation causes). The more
contentious the parties, the more likely they are to seek the court's intervention, increase
discovery demands, and refuse to concede any point. See THE CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, supra note
17 (discussing the various costs of litigation).
22. Judy MacFarlane & John Manwaring, Reconciling Professional Legal Education with
the Evolving (Trial-less) Reality ofLegal Practice, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 253, 254 (2006).
23. Gerald R. Williams & Joseph M. Geis, Negotiation Skills Training in the Law School
Curriculum, in TEACHING NEGOTIATION: IDEAS AND INNOVATIONS 203-07 (Michael Wheeler
ed., 2000).
24. Donna Shestowsky, Psychology and Persuasion, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S
FIELDBOOK: THE DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 361, 362 (Andrea
Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006) ("The kind of training in logic and
reasoning that lawyers typically receive in law school and in legal practice can make it
challenging for them to truly appreciate that the use of such formal argumentation is but one way
to persuade."). One example of this disconnect is the way apologies play out in negotiation and
litigation. Although offering a complete apology means that the case will usually settle more
quickly, when lawyers get involved they see apologies from the other side as increasing their
settlement values because they increase the likelihood of success at trial. See Jonathan R. Cohen,
Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 1011-12 (1999); Jennifer K. Robbennolt,
Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 349, 381 (2008)
(discussing defense attorneys' views on client apologies).
25. JEROME T. BARRETT, A HISTORY OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 211-14
(2004).
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turned to mediation in astounding numbers.26 The surge in growth surrounding
the study and implementation of alternative-dispute resolution is often traced
back to the Pound Conference, assembled nearly thirty-five years ago as a way
27to address a perceived dissatisfaction with the operation of the justice system.
The widespread use of mediation as a court-ordered tool to control dockets was
28
one outgrowth from that conference. But, more importantly, the Conference
sparked a vibrant debate among scholars, practitioners, and judges about the
role of alternative-dispute resolution in the justice system and in society at
large. 29  Scholars also began to study the effectiveness of this alternative
process and the ways in which participants in the process could maximize its
benefits. 30
B. Accepted Principles
Legal-negotiation theory draws upon a wide array of knowledge and
expertise to understand why some parties favorably resolve disputes, though
others come to an impasse. This theory operates on certain widely accepted
principles, namely that parties are usually better off settling their disputes than
litigating them. Settlement is no longer seen as a simple cost-saving
calculation.33 Instead, settlement is a way to avoid the ancillary costs of
26. Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the "Vanishing Trial": The Growth and Impact of
"Alternative Dispute Resolution," 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843, 849-50 (2004).
27. Dorothy J. Della Noce, Mediation Theory and Policy: The Legacy of the Pound
Conference, 17 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 545, 546 (2002).
28. Main, supra note 16, at 335-41.
29. See Della Noce, supra note 27, at 551-55 (discussing the debate in the mediation
context). Compare Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining with a Hugger: The Weaknesses and
Limitations of a Communitarian Conception of Legal Dispute Bargaining, or Why We Can't All
Just Get Along, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 1-16 (2007) (arguing that the adversarial
model of negotiation is more effective in practice than the problem-solving approach), with Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View ofLegal Negotiation: The Structure ofProblem Solving,
31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 755-59 (1984) (arguing that the problem-solving approach to negotiation
more effectively accomplishes the purpose of negotiation than does an adversarial approach).
30. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Chronicling the Complexification of Negotiation Theory
and Practice, 25 NEGOT. J. 415, 416-19 (2009) (discussing the evolution of alternative-dispute
resolution over the years and noting the aim of a "'joint gain' . . . for all of the parties").
31. CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, DISPUTE PROCESSING AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY xviii (2003) (noting that some "work in conflict
theory has been derived from organizational management, labour relations and the applied
sciences of decision-making and problem-solving" (internal citations omitted)).
32. Kiser et al., supra note 19, at 590.
33. See Stipanowich, supra note 26, at 848 (noting that alternative-dispute resolution is seen
as an intervention strategy to promote what a trial was not designed to accomplish" and
including a list of those goals); see also Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Clients, and
Mediation, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1364, 1386-87 (1998) (discussing the lawyer's role in
understanding additional factors, such as the client's emotional concerns as well as the financial
costs of litigation).
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litigation, such as destroyed relationships, loss of control, lack of creative
solutions, and loss of time.3 4
Negotiation textbooks now include multidisciplinary research from
economics, game theory, social psychology, and philosophy.35  Legal-
negotiation theory sees collaborative negotiations, also known as cooperative
or problem-solving negotiations, as more effective than competitive ones;
collaborative negotiators understand that emotions play a significant role in the
process and they attempt to distribute the benefits of settlement to all parties in
a negotiation.36 The literature suggests that legal disputes are efficiently and
effectively resolved when the parties search for integrative solutions that
incorporate a variety of interests, not just money. Parties are warned to avoid
hostility and blame,38 to frame solutions as gains rather than losses,39 and to
34. Stipanowich, supra note 26, at 848, 855, 859, 861; see also ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET
AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 227 (2000)
("Lawyers are often told to settle early-by clients, judges, scholars, and books . . . on
negotiation. It's good advice. The problem in litigation is not that cases don't settle; it's that they
settle late, after huge costs have been incurred.").
35. See CHARLES B. CRAVER, supra note 6, at 153-60 (discussing psychological theories in
the context of negotiation techniques); FOLBERG & GOLAN, supra note 6, passim (using
psychology and game theory in the negotiation textbook); KOROBKIN, supra note 6, at 25-90
(using economics and psychology in the negotiation textbook); MENKEL-MEADOW, supra note
31, at xvi-xxv (discussing the multidisciplinary areas that dispute resolution incorporates);
NELKEN, supra note 6, at 197-258 (incorporating psychological principles into the discussion on
negotiation theory); CHARLES B. WIGGINS & L. RANDOLPH LOWRY, NEGOTIATION &
SETTLEMENT ADVOCACY: A BOOK OF READINGS 39-41, 255-59 (2d ed. 2005) (incorporating
economics into negotiation techniques).
36. See KOROBKIN, supra note 6, at 229-31 (discussing the differences between cooperative
and competitive negotiation styles); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 29, at 758 (discussing the
benefits of the problem-solving style of negotiation); Robert H. Mnookin, Scott R. Peppet &
Andrew S. Tulumello, The Tension Between Empathy and Assertiveness, 12 NEGOT. J. 217
(1996), reprinted in KOROBKIN, supra note 6, at 228-30 (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of negotiations being empathetic, cooperative, and competitive). But see Condlin,
supra note 29, at 8-16 (showing that there is no support for the notion that negotiators who are
more cordial and cooperative are more effective at bargaining).
37. See Max H. Bazerman, Negotiator Judgment: A Critical Look at the Rationality
Assumption, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 211, 211-15 (1983); MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 34, at 11-26.
38. Chia-Jung Tsay & Max H. Bazerman, A Decision-Making Perspective to Negotiation: A
Review of the Past and a Look to the Future, 25 NEGOT. J. 467, 473 (2009); see also Elizabeth E.
Bader, The Psychology of Mediation: Issues of Self and Identity and the IDR Cycle, 10 PEPP.
DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 183, 196 (2010) ("[M]uch of the hostility and sense of insult parties exhibit in
mediation is a defensive reaction to underlying feelings of shame or vulnerability."); Korobkin,
supra note 13, at 298-303.
39. CRAVER, supra note 6 at 153-54; Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and
Biases at the Bargaining Table, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 795, 802 (2004) [hereinafter Korobkin &
Guthrie, Heuristics]; see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of
Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 176 (1996) ("Just as the loser-pays system induces excessive
litigation, so too does litigation in which both parties view the litigation as a loss.").
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view the negotiation as a collaborative process rather than a win-win, one-time
attempt to settle before trial.40
Although lawyers and courts are now applying these accepted principles
more frequently, the principles are aimed almost entirely at face-to-face
41
negotiations or in-the-room mediations. Legal-negotiation textbooks
42
downplay written negotiations, focusing instead on oral negotiations. And,
when these texts address written communication, they completely ignore the
demand letter.43  Despite a growing movement toward alternative-dispute
resolution,44 the principles at its core are being applied too late or not at all. 45
By the time parties meet face-to-face, they most likely have exchanged
46
correspondence and other documents. Yet, the documents that enshrine the
parties' initial demands and negotiation positions have been nearly ignored in
the negotiation literature.
47
40. Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 33
(1996) (observing that "negotiation unfolds in predictable stages over time").
41. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Courting Compliance, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK: THE
DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR, supra note 24, at 271. This focus is
especially curious when many writers acknowledge that face-to-face communications likely result
in different bargaining styles and lead to different results than other forms of communication,
such as phone conferences or e-mail exchanges. See Lynn A. Epstein, Cyber E-Mail Negotiation
vs. Traditional Negotiation: Will Cyber Technology Supplant Traditional Means of Settling
Litigation?, 36 TULSA L.J. 839, 841-42 (2001).
42. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
43. See supra note 6.
44. See Dorcas Quek, Mandatory Mediation: An Oxymoron? Examining the Feasibility of
Implementing a Court-Mandated Mediation Program, II CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 479,
484 (2010).
45. DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES, EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR
NEUTRALS AND ADVOCATES xvii (2009) (noting that mediation often occurs too late in a
lawsuit).
46. Id Texts and studies on legal negotiation generally apply to the negotiation that focuses
on the ultimate dispute; they ignore the reality that, before parties convene in a room together,
they have already had a negotiation-a negotiation about whether the parties will meet at all.
This negotiation may turn out to be the most difficult. Negotiation theory overlooks the notion
that simply convincing another party to meet or to listen is sometimes a major accomplishment.
Mediators are advised that the parties have often become bitterly embroiled in conflict before
they mediate the dispute. Id. One commentator, in a book written for mediators, explains that
[p]arties in [serious legal disputes] hire lawyers, make serious allegations against
each other, and often endure years of bitter and expensive litigation before they think
seriously about settling their dispute. By this time, whatever interest the litigants may
have had in relating with each other is usually gone, and many would prefer not even to
talk with the other.
Id
47. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. For example, Russell Korobkin and Chris
Guthrie claim that "the opening settlement offer is perhaps the most important aspect of the
bargaining strategy employed by a litigant" because exchanges are typically limited; they fail to
mention anything about written demands, however. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Opening
Offers and Out-of-Court Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go a Long Way, 10 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 3 (1994) [hereinafter Korobkin & Guthrie, Opening Offers].
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Perhaps the experts fail to consider the written demand because they believe
that the advice about negotiations has an obvious connection with the written
demand, and it therefore needs no comment-lawyers would obviously know
how to apply the advice about face-to-face negotiations to their written offers
to settle. The current negotiation literature, however, seems to challenge this
assumption because scholars are now beginning to pay particular attention to
written negotiations in the electronic medium-that is e-mail and texting.48
Advice regarding negotiating via e-mail has become fairly common but
remains rather cursory. 49 And because the literature covers e-mail negotiations
but not demand letters, it feasibly could lead a student or practitioner to believe
that demand letters are not part of the negotiation process.
More likely, experts fail to consider the written demand due to a belief that
written documents are different from face-to-face negotiations, that emotions
do not drive our responses to written communication, and that written
communication invokes a cognitive reaction that is free from the emotional
binds that plague our face-to-face negotiations.50  The empirical research,
however, contradicts this belief 5
48. Nadler & Shestowsky, supra note 6, at 145-46 (noting that, traditionally, researchers
have focused on face-to-face negotiations and arguing that the growth of information technology,
especially e-mail, requires scholars to focus on these new forms of media and their effects on
negotiations); see also Epstein, supra note 41, at 839-40.
49. See, e.g., FOLBERG & GOLANN, supra note 6 (allocating only seventeen pages in a
nearly four-hundred-and-fifty-page textbook to e-mail negotiations); Epstein, supra note 41, at
842-43 (contemplating the use of well-known negotiating techniques in e-mail-making extreme
demands, splitting the difference, and providing successive concessions-but warning that these
may backfire and are probably borderline unethical, therefore ultimately advising lawyers to be
straightforward in written e-mail exchanges).
50. Epstein, supra note 41, at 842 ("A written communication avoids the psychological
games lawyers often engage in during face-to-face negotiations."). Michael Moffitt notes that
written pleadings can serve as an impediment to settlement because these written documents fail
to construct a complex vision of the past, eliminate the emotion from problems, look to past
events rather than future events, and limit solutions to those that are law-based. Michael Moffitt,
Pleadings in the Age ofSettlement, 80 IND. L.J. 727, 747 (2005). Moffitt's solution is not to
change the manner of pleading, but, instead, to create face-to-face, pre-suit conferences so that
the parties can negotiate before the pleadings constrain their problem-solving. Id This solution
has two problems: first, it ignores the power of the written word to shape people's views, ignite
their emotions, and drive their behavior, and, second, it assumes that "[1]egal disputes begin with
the pleading." Id. at 728. Legal disputes, however, do not begin in the court system; they seek
resolution in the court system. And, before suit is filed, parties have almost certainly engaged in
failed written and verbal negotiations. Therefore, the search for solutions to the negotiation
impasse should begin much earlier than the pleading stage.
51. See infra Part III.A. The empirical research calls into question the whole idea of
conscious, rational thought and its supreme role in decision-making. If anything, the research in
social psychology is changing the definition of rational decision-making. Until recently, rational
thought was seen as a conscious, deliberate thought process. See Ap Dijksterhuis, Automiticity
and the Unconscious, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 252 (Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T.
Gilbert & Gamder Lindzey eds., 5th ed. 2010). But social psychologists have taught that
conscious deliberation is not necessary for rational decision-making. See id. Studies continue to
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Written words can spark emotions and drive people's behavior in ways of
which they are completely unaware.52 The current research makes it
impossible for lawyers to ignore the extra-textual effects that written
53
communication may have on a client's demand. Perhaps the recipient of a
carefully reasoned demand letter fully and logically contemplates the lawyer's
well-reasoned arguments, but psychologists have demonstrated that a lawyer's
54
words have effects far beyond conscious reason. Because demand letters are
often precursors to further negotiations, lawyers should seek to understand
their potential effects on the recipients before committing their original
positions to writing.55
II. THE DEMAND LETTER AS AN IMPORTANT EARLY STEP IN NEGOTIATION
Generally, legal negotiations start with some form of written demand,
sometimes addressed to the party and sometimes addressed to the party's legal
56counsel. Although very little research has been conducted on written
negotiation, there are several reasons to believe that the demand letter is an
important piece of the legal-negotiation process.58  First, the demand letter
directly addresses the relevant party rather than a third-party judge or
mediator.59 It often establishes the first impressions of the parties in a
negotiation, and studies confirm that these first impressions are extremely hard
to overcome,60 perhaps driving the course of the litigation. Second, the
expose instances where unconscious heuristics lead a person to make better decisions than experts
who engage in conscious and deliberate weighing of the evidence before deciding. See Daniel G.
Goldstein & Gerd Gigerenzer, Models of Ecological Rationality: The Recognition Heuristics, 109
PSYCHOL. REV. 75, 75-88 (2002).
52. See, e.g., Melissa J. Ferguson & John A. Bargh, How Social Perception Can
Automatically Influence Behavior, 8 TRENDS COGNITIVE Sci. 33, 33-39 (2004) (discussing
priming studies).
53. See infra Part Ill.A (discussing priming studies and their effect on the written demand).
54. See infra Part ill.A.
55. See Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2010-12 (explaining that demand letters are
sometimes required before the court will allow parties to engage in any other actions).
56. RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING: STRUCTURE,
STRATEGY, AND STYLE 273 (6th ed. 2009).
57. Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2020; see also Shestowsky, supra note 24, at 368
("[V]ery little psychological research has examined persuasion specifically in the negotiation
context, psychology has produced a wealth of research on persuasion more broadly that can serve
as a helpful guide.").
58. See Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 1983-84.
59. Id. at 1999 ("[T]he primary audience for a complaint is often, if not usually the judge,
while advocacy documents, such as demand letters, are primarily drafted to convince the
opposing party or lawyer or a corporate defendant's management group or the person with the
authority to settle.").
60. See Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Power ofPriming in Legal Advocacy: Using the Science of
First Impressions to Persuade the Reader, OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 1-2)
[hereinafter Stanchi, The Power ofPriming], available at http://ssm.com/abstract- 1604150.
61. See id (manuscript at 45-47) (describing the importance of priming in litigation).
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demand letter may be the only opportuni to present the opposing side with an
"integrated narrative of law and fact." This integration is important for
settling disputes, but the rules of civil procedure often fail to give parties the
opportunity to make this integration before trial.63 Finally, the American legal
system has somewhat institutionalized the demand letter, often requiring one
before a plaintiff may file suit." Therefore, whether it is required by law or
written as an invitation to settle, the demand letter plays an important role in
legal negotiations.
A. First Impressions Are Difficult to Overcome
Lawyers should carefully consider how to initially approach a negotiation
because this approach can have lasting effects throughout the negotiation.65
There are many well-tested examples of the way first impressions influence the
course of negotiations.66 Experts try to understand these processes in order to
avoid unproductive negotiations or to gain an advantage in a particular
negotiation.67 Therefore, to understand the potential effects the demand letter
may have on its recipient, it is necessary to understand the psychological biases
and short cuts at work when negotiations begin. 68
1. Initial Biases
Studies confirm that first impressions are extremely hard to overcome.69
Once a party takes an initial position, that party is likely to value evidence that
supports that position and devalue evidence that does not.70  Furthermore,
62. Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2002-03.
63. Id. at 2001; see also Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Untold Stories: Restoring
Narrative to Pleading Practice, 15 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 3 (2009) ("Over
the centuries, this narrative aspect of the complaint, the telling of plaintiffs tale through
substantive allegations, has been eclipsed by the several instrumental functions of complaints
even as those functions-invoking the court's jurisdiction, providing notice to the defendant,
narrowing the issues, uncovering facts-have themselves waxed and waned in importance.");
Moffitt, supra note 50, at 728 (discussing the disconnect between what pleading rules require and
what negotiation theory suggests to facilitate settlement from the outset).
64. See infra Part II.C.
65. Robert S. Adler, Flawed Thinking: Addressing Decision Biases in Negotiation, 20 OHIO
ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 683, 712-13 (2005).
66. See infra Part II.A.1-2.
67. See infra Part II.A.1-2.
68. See Adler, supra note 65, at 712-13.
69. See Stanchi, The Power ofPriming, supra note 60, at 1-8.
70. Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of
Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
2098, 2101-05 (1979) (demonstrating that both those people with strong pro-death penalty beliefs
and those with strong anti-death penalty beliefs viewed the same subsequent evidence as
confirming their respective positions); see also Tsay & Bazerman, supra note 38, at 470-71
(explaining that study participants tended to better recall information supporting their
perspectives).
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people generally take self-interested positions and assess their positions in a
71 72biased way. Placing people in a partisan role only strengthens their biases.
For example, in one study, partici ants were divided into two groups: jury
members and non-jury members. Those in the jury group received
background information and information on both sides of each case.74 Non-
jury members received only partial information, either background or one-
sided information.75 Researchers directed all participants to guess how a jury
of twenty members would have voted on the specific cases. Those with
plaintiff-only information believed that more jurors would vote for the
plaintiff, and those with defendant-only information believed that less jurors
would vote for the plaintiff.77  Each group was biased toward the side for
which they had been selected even though they knew that they had not been
provided the arguments for the other side.78 More importantly, those with only
partial information recorded higher certainty in their predictions than those
who received full and balanced information on the cases. 79 The researchers
expected that less information would result in a lower degree of certainty, but
the effect was the opposite.80
In addition to the tendency to see facts with a self-interested bias, when
confronted with anger or other negative emotions, people tend to escalate their
anger.81  Anger creates a desire to retaliate, and the parties enter a cycle of
71. Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of
Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 109, 112-13 (1997) (demonstrating that participants
will predict higher awards in a hypothetical case for the side to which they had been randomly
assigned, even though both sides were given the same information); Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley
Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. OF ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 130-32
(1954) (confirming through an empirical study that Dartmouth and Princeton students viewed a
football game between the two teams with significant bias in favor of their own team); Tsay &
Bazerman, supra note 38, at 470-71; see also Birke & Fox, supra note 13, at 14 ("In general,
people have great difficulty divorcing themselves from their idiosyncratic role sufficiently to take
an objective view of disputes in which they are involved.").
72. Babcock, supra note 71, at 120. Babcock and Loewenstein note that "differences in
roles" can cause one to gravitate to his own biases. Id
- 73. Lyle A. Brenner et al., On the Evaluation of One-Sided Evidence, 9 J. OF BEHAV.
DECISION MAKING 59, 61 (1996).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 63.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 68.
81. Daniel L. Shapiro, Preempting Disaster: Pre-Mediation Strategies to Deal with Strong
Emotions, in THE BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF MEDIATION 311 (Margaret S. Herrman ed., 2006)
("[E]ach party's strong emotions can fuel their own escalating emotions . . . ."); see also Robert
S. Adler et al., Emotions in Negotiation: How to Manage Fear and Anger, 14 NEGOT. J. 161, 164
(1998) (explaining that negative emotions tend to engage more quickly because of their primal
use in instinctual human survival); Jefferey L. McClellan, Marrying Positive Psychology to
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agitation that is hard to break.82 Therefore, although a lawyer could expect the
recipient of a demand letter to take a self-interested position at the outset of a
negotiation, once the recipient becomes angry and defensive, the likelihood of
efficient resolution becomes remote. 83 This is because anger changes the way
the brain operates; 84 peole become less creative and cooperative, and, instead,
become more vindictive. 5
Similarly, the perception of unfairness, like anger, has a powerful, negative
influence on negotiations and can lead a person to give up something of value
simply to punish the person who is perceived to be acting unfairly. 6 Using
variations on an experiment known as the "Ultimatum Game," researchers
have demonstrated a person's pro ensity to suffer losses in order to punish
another who has behaved unfairly.8  The game involves two players and a sum
of money-for example, one hundred dollars. The first player must offer a
portion of the one hundred dollars to the second player. If the second player
accepts the offer, both players get to keep the money. If the second player
rejects the offer, both players walk away with nothing.89 Both know that these
are the rules of the game before they play it.90 As economists postulate, a
rational second player would accept any offer, even just one dollar because one
dollar is more than nothing, and nothing is what the second player would
receive if she rejected the offer.9 1 But this rarely happens. First players
generally offer between forty and fifty percent of the money, here forty or fifty
dollars.92 If the offer is less than an even split, the second player will often
reject the offer and the first player will walk away with nothing.93 This results
Mediation: Using Appreciative Inquiry and Solution-Focused Counseling to Improve the Process,
62 Disp. RESOL. J. 29, 31 (2007) (noting that as a cycle of angry emotions intensifies, "'edginess'
and arousal increase dramatically").
82. McClellan, supra note 81, at 31; see also Adler et al., supra note 81, at 168-69 ("[T]he
two most intense emotions that confront negotiators are fear and anger.").
83. Korobkin, supra note 13, at 300-01; Shapiro, supra note 81, at 311-12.
84. McClellen, supra note 81, at 31.
85. Adler, supra note 65, at 169 ("[A]nger motivates us to retaliate when we are attacked.");
Korobkin, supra note 13, at 300-01; McClellan, supra note 81, at 31; Shapiro, supra note 81.
86. Korobkin, supra note 13, at 300-01 ("A party with a malevolent utility function places a
positive value on preventing the opposing party from obtaining what she wants from the
lawsuit.").
87. Martin A. Nowak et al., Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game, 289 SC. 1773,
1773-74 (2000).
88. Id. at 1773.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Birke & Fox, supra note 13, at 36 n.152; Nowak et al., supra note 87, at 1773.
92. Nowak et al., supra note 87, at 1773.
93. See id (concluding that half the responders reject offers below thirty percent); see also
Werner Goth et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 367, 368 (1982).
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because the second player would rather take nothing than allow what she sees
as an unfair windfall to the first player. 94
Because of these reactions, experts advise negotiators to expect a biased
participant and to avoid insults, shame, blame, and other techniques that would
cause the othervparty to erupt in anger, and, rather, to focus the other party on
fair outcomes.9 Of course, negotiators are wise to heed the experts' advice.
But, what if the other party is already angered by a shaming demand letter or
feels unfairly treated after receiving an insulting offer? The appropriate time
to consider these biases is when the parties initiate their communications,
whether face-to-face or in writing.96
2. Favorable Heuristic Reasoning9 7
In contrast to negative emotions, which can impede settlement, initial
positive emotions can facilitate settlement. First, when a person has positive
feelings toward someone, that person is apt to reason through heuristics, or
mental shortcuts.99 On the other hand, negative, distrustful emotions cause a
person to reason more logically, and thus require more proof before making a
decision.100  Therefore, a letter that emits negative emotions will likely
generate the need for heightened persuasion.101  Alternatively, a letter that
generates positive emotions may set the stage for more favorable, heuristic
reasoning.
94. Gith et al., supra note 93, at 368.
95. Tsay & Bazerman, supra note 38, at 470-73.
96. See Daniel L. Shapiro, Emotions in Negotiation: Peril or Promise?, 87 MARQ. L. REV.
737, 740-41 (2004) (discussing biases and emotions encountered upon initiating negotiation).
97. People often use mental shortcuts when making decisions. Dijksterhuis, supra note 51,
at 252-53. These mental shortcuts, or heuristics, are intuitive judgments driven by automatic
processes outside our conscious awareness. Id. at 252-53. Many researches describe heuristics
as highly adaptive human behavior because humans cannot consciously and carefully weigh each
judgment or decision they face. Id. at 253. The problem with heuristic reasoning is that it is
susceptible to systemic biases. See id. at 252-53.
98. Shirli Kopelman et al., The Three Faces of Eve: Strategic Displays of Positive,
Negative, and Neutral Emotions in Negotiations, 99 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 81, 83 (2006); Gerben A. Van Kleef et al., The Interpersonal Effects of
Emotions in Negotiations: A Motivated Information Processing Approach, 87 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 510 (2004).
99. G. Robert J. Hockey et al., Effects of Negative Mood States on Risk in Everyday
Decision Making, 14 COGNITION & EMOTION 823, 825 (2000); see also Stanchi, The Power of
Priming, supra note 60, at 15-16 (discussing the effects of positive and negative emotions on
cognitive function and decision-making); Tsay & Bazerman, supra note 38, at 473-74.
100. See Hockey et al., supra note 99, at 825 (discussing the studies on the effects of negative
mood on mental processing and decision-making); Stanchi, The Power ofPriming, supra note 60,
at 15 ("The result of pessimism ... is a narrowed focus of attention and motivation to process
information more deeply and systematically.").
101. See Hockey etal., supra note 99, 825.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
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One example of a favorable heuristic is the foot-in-the-door effect. 03
Strategies that take advantage of this favorable heuristic rely on studies that
demonstrate people's willingness to comply with more imposing requests if
they first accede to an initial, smaller request. 104 Once people give in to a
demand or make a concession, they are much more likely to give in to larger
demands or make more substantial concessions. 05 For example, people who
previously agreed to sign a socially conscious petition to "keep California
beautiful" will more likely agree later to "put a big sign on their lawn . . .
advocat[ing] safe driving."' 06 Achieving that first point of agreement, then,
becomes crucial to making more significant advancements later in the
negotiating process.107
Unconscious anchors may also cause favorable heuristic reasoning because
they affect people's later, seemingly unrelated, perceptions.108 An anchor is a
value that serves as an initial reference point.109 Even when this initial value is
completely unrelated to an estimate or a negotiation, the initial value affects
the subsequent estimated value or offer.110 For example, in one of the first
studies on the effects of anchoring, researchers asked participants to spin a
wheel that contained random numbers and then asked them to guess what
percentage of African countries are members of the United Nations.1 ' " The
answers were affected by the number upon which the wheel landed.112 If the
wheel landed on the number ten, participants were more likely to guess around
twenty-five percent, but if the wheel landed on sixty-five, participants were
more likely to guess closer to forty-five percent.113 Thus, the number on the
wheel, which had no relation to Africa or international political organizations,
served as an unconscious anchor for participants' later choice.114
103. Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science ofPersuasion: An Initial Exploration, 2006 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 411, 418-19 (2006) [hereinafter Stanchi, The Science ofPersuasion].
104. Id
105. Id
106. Id. at 418 n.27 (citing DANIEL O'KEEFE, PERSUASION: THEORY AND RESEARCH 169
(1990)).
107. One can imagine that even a relatively small request-perhaps simply to meet in
person-sets the stage for a larger request later.
108. Chris Guthrie, Insights from Cognitive Psychology, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 42, 44 (2004).
109. Thomas D. Gilovich & Dale W. Griffin, Judgment and Decision Making, in HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 552-54 (Susan T. Fiske et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010) (describing the
anchoring heuristic).
I10. Guthrie, supra note 108, at 44; Dan Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information,
Expertise, and Negotiation: New Insights from Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL.
597, 597 (2006).
Ill. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128 (1974).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
[ Vol. 60: 1071 22
Priming Legal Negotiations Through Written Demands
In negotiations, extreme initial offers can actually result in better settlement
terms for the offeror, probably due to the effects of anchoring.115  A study
conducted by Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie demonstrates this effect." 6
Korobkin and Guthrie gave two groups identical information about a defective
new car and asked participants to play the role of the car purchaser." 7  The
participants were told that, to avoid a lawsuit, the dealer made a final offer to
pay the purchaser $12,000 if the purchaser kept the defective car." In one
group, the participants were told they had already rejected the dealer's initial
offer of $2,000 and continued ownership of the car. 19 The other group was
told it had rejected the dealer's initial offer of $10,000 and the option to keep
the car.120 The participants in the group with the $2,000 initial offer were more
likely to accept the $12,000 final offer than those in the group where the dealer
offered $10,000 initially.12 1
This study supports the argument that extreme initial offers likely result in a
more favorable settlement simply due to the subconscious effects of
anchoring.122 The initial offer anchored the value of the settlement. Those
who received a $2,000 initial offer saw the $12,000 as a vast improvement-a
good deal. 12 3 Those who received the $10,000 initial offer saw the $12,000 as
too similar to the initial rejected offer.124 Therefore, the initial offer may act as
an anchor, having lasting effects on the amount of a final settlement. 2 For
these reasons, lawyers would be wise to cautiously choose the number they use
when initiating negotiations, especially in writing.126
Finally, framing can be a powerful way to harness favorable heuristics.127
Many authors have discussed the power of framing in negotiations, especially
115. See Guthrie, supra note 108, at 44 ("[A] negotiator can use an extreme opening offer to
anchor her counterpart."); Korobkin & Guthrie, Heuristics, supra note 39, at 806 (noting that
extreme opening demands increase the likelihood of recharging a settlement agreement);
Korobkin & Guthrie, Opening Offers, supra note 47, at 3-5 ("Because pretrial bargaining
typically includes few exchanges, the opening settlement offer is perhaps the most important
aspect of the bargaining strategy employed by a litigant, and it deserves special attention.").
116. Korobkin & Guthrie, Opening Offers, supra note 47, at 1, 4-5.
117. Id at 11-12.
118. Id
119. Id at 12-13.
120. Id
121. Id at 13.
122. Id at 13, 19.
123. Id at 19.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. See id at 3 ("Because pretrial bargaining typically includes few exchanges, the opening
settlement offer is perhaps the most important aspect of the bargaining strategy employed by a
litigant, and it deserves special attention.").
127. See Rachlinski, supra note 39, at 119-21.
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the effects of framing losses as gains.128 For example, researchers have shown
that the simple framing technique of reporting outcomes in terms of gains
rather than in terms of losses significantly affects participants' choices.129 One
early study, known as the "Asian disease" problem, asked participants to
assume six hundred people were facing exposure to a lethal disease. 30 The
participants were then asked to choose between two courses of treatment.' 3 '
With program A, two hundred people would be saved. With program B, there
would be a one-third chance of saving all six hundred people, but a two-thirds
chance of not saving anyone.132 Given these two choices, most participants
chose program A-to take the certain gain of saving two hundred people. 133
However, results changed drastically when a different group of participants
were given the same choices, but the scenarios were framed in terms of losses
instead of gains. 134 In this study, participants chose between program A where
four hundred people certainly would die and program B, where there was a
one-third chance nobody would die, and a two-thirds chance that six hundred
people would die.135  Given this new, negative frame, a majority of the
participants chose program B instead of A, even though the actual data had not
changed. 136
The evidence on framing effects should caution attorneys writing demand
letters. Lawyers should understand that people would rather opt for a certain
gain rather than a certain loss.' 37  But, more importantly, people choose
uncertain losses over certain losses. Because settlement offers are usually
certain losses, typically described as a stated amount of money, parties
receiving demand letters are probably more inclined to choose the uncertainty
of a future loss at trial than a certain loss today.139 Lawyers would be wise to
work on reframing their offers, especially those they commit to writing.
For these many well-tested reasons, parties should concern themselves with
the other side's initial impressions. 140 Although many people tend to think of
128. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 39, at 118-28 (providing an extensive discussion of the
framing effects in litigation).
129. Id. at 123.
130. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453 (1981).
131. See id
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id
135. Id
136. Id
137. Id
138. Id at 453-54.
139. See Rachlinski, supra note 39, at 128-29 (demonstrating through statistical data that a
defendant is less likely to accept a monetary settlement offer that will result in a certain loss).
140. See Adler, supra note 65, at 712-13 (explaining that initial impressions, even if false,
may dominate the entire negotiation).
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negotiations as face-to-face interactions, they often start in writing. Attorneys
should contemplate the potential first impressions their letters will have on
opposing parties because those initial impressions are likely to have long-
lasting consequences in the way future negotiations play out. Therefore, the
demand letter, although a written document, cannot be ignored.
B. The Importance ofLaw-Fact Integration
Evidence suggests that the earlier a party is able to tell her story to the other
side through integrating the facts and the law, the more likely the parties will
settle.141 One way to integrate law and fact effectively is through narrative.142
Legal writing scholars have increasingly focused on the importance of
narrative in composing a compelling legal argument, 143 and the demand letter
provides an ideal forum for persuasive narrative.144 These experts have
employed techniques used in other disciplines to study the well-accepted
principle that narrative is an essential element in persuasion. 145 A story works
better as a tool of persuasion than does simple logic.146
141. See Gary Paquin & Linda Harvey, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Transformative
Mediation and Narrative Mediation: A Natural Connection, 3 FLA. COASTAL. L.J. 167, 170
(2002) (explaining that allowing each party the opportunity to tell her story can be therapeutic and
invoke feelings of empathy in the other party, increasing the likelihood of settlement); Subrin &
Main, supra note 4, at 2018 (citing Jason Curriden, Woolf Reforms Target Inefficiency and
Inequity in UK Court System, INSIDE LITIG. July 1999, at 1, 2, 4) ("[G]etting potential litigants to
tell their stores in advance makes sense . . . and this will help many of them settle earlier and with
more information.").
142. See Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story, 14 LEGAL
WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 127, 131 (2008) (explaining that narrative can integrate the
client's story among the legal facts).
143. See, e.g., id. at 130-32 (asserting that the use of narratives is advantageous in writing
appellate briefs); Fajans & Falk, supra note 63, at 15 ("[T]he careful drafter's job is to use
traditional storytelling techniques to the client's advantage); J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling,
Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 53,
57 (2008) (discussing how the use of narratives can lead to positive outcomes in trial); Ruth Anne
Robbins, An Introduction to Applied Storytelling, 14 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST.
3, 7 n.18 (2008) ("[H]ave we not reached the point where we can just take judicial notice that
stories are an important form of human communication?"); see also Stanchi, The Power of
Priming, supra note 60, at 7 (suggesting the use of priming to influence the reader's view of the
facts in written advocacy).
144. Rappaport, supra note 6, at 46.
145. See Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 361, 383-84 (1996) (discussing the role of the narrative and using "literary insights" to
explore the narrative's effect); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror
Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 520 (1991) (using "the
perspective of psychologists who are interested in how people think and behave" to explore
decision-making in juries).
146. Rideout, supra note 143, at 60. Of course, stories must adhere to logic and consistency
in order to persuade. See Fajans & Falk, supra note 63, at 17 (explaining that the soundness of a
story is critical to its success).
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Stories form a person's understanding of the world, and her place in the
world. 14 7 Stories, unlike facts, incorporate our underlying values and a sense
of order. 148 Stories give shape to human reality.149 Humans have used stories
as an effective form of communication for so long that some scholars believe
the narrative schema is "innate." 50
Furthermore, there is inherent value in a client simply telling her story.' 5 1
Too often, legal disputes become disconnected from the narrative that allows
people to make sense, not only of the legal claims, but also of the human
emotions and values that underlie the legal claims.152 Finally, humans often
see the world in the context of certain narrative forms-the hero versus the
villain,153 the mythic birth or rebirth,154 the mystery. 155 The lawyer's job is to
identify a fitting narrative for her client's case that will provide the appropriate
lens through which others will see her moral and legal plight.156
147. See Bandes, supra note 145, at 383 ("We make sense of the world by ordering it into
metaphors, and ultimately into narratives."); Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 1985 ("[H]umans
attempt to understand reality by identifying some of the many variables in a given situation and
then weaving them into a comprehensible story.").
148. Stories even form the foundation of most people's understanding of the deity, the
beginnings of the universe, and our religious traditions.
149. Rideout, supra note 143, at 59.
150. See id. at 55.
151. See Fajans & Falk, supra note 63, at 22 (arguing that "narrative fidelity is achieved
when our clients can recognize their own stories"); Paquin & Harvey, supra note 141, at 170
(asserting that allowing a client to tell her story can be "cathartic").
152. See Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2001-02 (suggesting that, in the multitudes of
settlement cases, a client's story may be overlooked). But see Bandes, supra note 145, at 383-88.
Bandes persuasively argues that narrative is present in every legal dispute, but the narrative may
be different in different contexts. Id. at 384-85. Traditional legal narrative reinforces the status
quo, preferring narratives of formalism to narratives of empathy. See id at 387-89. Therefore,
although the client's story is not dislodged from an emotional and value-laden narrative, it is told
through a narrative entirely inappropriate for the task of healing and reconciling.
153. Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client's Story
Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero's Journey, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
767, 768-69 (2006).
154. Linda H. Edwards, Once upon a Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, and Authority, 77
TENN. L. REv. (forthcoming fall 2010) (manuscript at 8), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-14
62570.
155. Philip N. Meyer, Retelling the Darkest Story: Mystery, Suspense, and Detectives in a
Brief Written on Behalf of a Condemned Inmate, 58 MERCER L. REV. 665, 667 (2007).
156. See Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 353, 368 (1996) ("Facts do not speak for themselves, and stories do not tell themselves.
The good lawyer fits the story that he has to tell into the available stock of culturally recognized
narratives that connect his client to familiar and recognizable themes."). Kathryn Stanchi argues
that priming studies can help lawyers chose a theme of the case when writing their briefs, noting
that "[olne of the earliest decisions a legal advocate must make is what the overarching theme or
feel of the case is going to be." Stanchi, The Power of Priming, supra note 60, at 8-9. This is
good advice, but the choice should be made much earlier than when lawyers begin writing briefs
for their cases. Lawyers must decide on the way they will present their clients' stories before the
negotiations begin. Of course, the story may change once a case is filed because the audience is
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Although narratives undoubtedly play an important role in legal persuasion,
our rules of civil procedure fail to foster an integration of law and fact into a
meaningful narrative before trial. 157  The modem rules of civil procedure
require plaintiffs to offer only a "short and plain statement" when initiating a
lawsuit. Plaintiffs' facts are often separated from the legal claims.
Defendants answer by simply admitting or denying each allegation in the
complaint. ' Likewise, the rules of discovery do not require the parties to set
forth any sort of factual narrative.160 In fact, Rule 26 assumes that the parties
will disclose documents based on their understanding of what evidence is
relevant to the legal claims at issue.'
Not until the summary-judgment stage does this process of
law-fact integration occur at any meaningful level.162 However,
some formulaic local rules require parties to separate the facts from
the relevant law, even in motions for summary judgment.163 In some
jurisdictions, parties file a statement of undisputed facts in a document
entirely separate from the brief containin& the party's legal arguments,
making the integration awkward at best.' Under the current rules of
now a third-party decision-maker. If lawyers wait until suit is filed to craft the client's story, they
have waited too long. When a lawsuit is filed, it likely means the pre-suit story probably failed to
persuade. See also Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 1986 (citing JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL
IMAGINATION 859 (1973)) (discussing the importance of telling a persuasive story).
157. See Moffitt, supra note 50, at 737-38 (arguing that "[p]leadings define problems in
ways that make wise and efficient settlement less likely" because they fail to incorporate
negotiation theory); Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 1987 ("[R]are is the pleading, motion, or
other paper with a fully integrated narrative of law and fact about the case.").
158. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). But see Fajans & Falk, supra note 63, at 14 (suggesting ways in
which lawyers can tell their clients' stories within the formal complaint).
159. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b). But see Fajans & Falk, supra note 63, at 14-15 (noting that the
narrative theory should be applied to complaints and answers).
160. Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 1999.
161. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a). But see Seymour Moskowitz, Discovery in State Civil Procedure:
The National Perspective, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 121, 128-33 (2007) (providing examples of state
discovery rules that deviate most strikingly from the federal rules in the area of discovery
practice).
162. Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2000. Summary-judgment rules also create an
incentive to increase the cost of pretrial discovery because many parties simply choose to litigate
their cases at the summary-judgment level. See John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 530-32 (2007).
163. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. LR 56.1. For example, the Northern District of Illinois's Local Rule
56.1 requires the movant to file a statement of material facts that is completely separate from the
legal arguments. Id. The non-movant must admit or deny each paragraph of fact. Id; see Sunil
R. Harjani, Local Rule 56.1: Common Pitfalls in Preparing a Summary Judgment Statement of
Facts, CBA RECORD, Oct. 2002, at 42, available at http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl s20
Publications/RelatedDocumentsPDFsl252/396/CBA%20Record%201002.pdf (discussing the
requirements of Local Rule 56.1).
164. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. LR 56.1; see also Harjani, supra note 163 (stating that, in an effort to
simplify the court's task of ruling on a motion for summary judgment, Northern District of
Illinois's Local Rule 56.1 requires facts to be relevant and stated concisely, and does not allow
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procedure, the all-important law-fact integration may not actually happen until
trial. 165
Although the rules of procedure operate against telling a client's coherent
narrative, lawyers are finding ways to present their clients' stories outside the
formal rules.1 6 6  Stephen Subrin and Thomas Main call this the "parallel
procedural universe"-a sphere outside the formal procedures where lawyers
are finding creative ways to meaningfully integrate law and fact.167 In this
realm, which is divorced from procedural formalities, lawyers are using
demand letters, exchanging notebooks, sending settlement brochures, and
producing sophisticated documentaries in order to effectively tell their client's
story persuasively with the hope that a favorable settlement will soon
follow.1 68
Lawyers operating in this parallel universe, using extra-procedural narratives
to facilitate settlement, probably have the right instincts about what techniques
effectively lead to settlement. However, they are operating on intuition and
experience.'6 Because their informal techniques are outside the formal
procedures and often shrouded from view, they are nearly inaccessible to
empirical study, resulting in a problematic lack of knowledge regarding the
reasons lawyers use these informal tactics.170 Furthermore, these settlement
documents are frequently privileged communications. 17 Rules of evidence
parties to intermingle their "[c]haracterizations, inferences, and legal conclusions" with the
statement of facts).
165. Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2000-01. Some have argued that, even in court-ordered
mediation, clients may be denied the opportunity to provide the other side with their own
narrative because lawyers have supplanted mediation with a lawyer-driven "bargaining
paradigm" that values economically grounded, rational negotiation. Nancy A. Welsh, Making
Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 787,
802-05 (2001).
166. See, e.g., Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2017 ("If we are right, the lawyers, largely on
their own, usually without a rule, and without a standard, seem to be fulfilling the need to
integrate law and fact into an advocacy narrative, and to share it with the opposition, their own
clients, and when desirable, with mediators.").
167. Id. at 2001-02.
168. Id. at 1983.
169. See Saks, supra note 10, at 802. Kathryn Stanchi argues that "the study of persuasive
writing has been dominated by a kind of 'armchair psychology'-a set of conventions and
practices, handed down from lawyer to lawyer, developed largely from instinct and speculation."
Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion, supra note 103, at 412. Lawyers must "reexamine the
validity of conventional wisdom" to determine whether the conventional wisdom is wrong. Id. at
413.
170. Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2020.
171. See FED. R. EVID. 408. But see Kristin M. Kerwin, Note, The Discoverability of
Settlement and ADR Communications: Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and Beyond, 12 REv. LITIG.
665, 669-84 (1993) (discussing the inconsistent patchwork of laws protecting settlement
communications from disclosure).
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often bar them from view, and they are not usually part of the record.172 As a
result, researches know almost nothing about this uncharted universe from an
empirical standpoint.' They do not know what kinds of materials are
effective or what principles are driving lawyers' decisions about how to
present their clients' narratives.174 Lawyers are creating a sphere of practice
that instinctively works to more efficiently resolve their cases. However,
without any empirical testing of their methods, we cannot really know what
works, why it works, or how it can be improved.
76
C. Demand Letters Often Required by Law
Lawyers no longer write and send demand letters simply as a common
practice or custom. Rather, they send demand letters based on statutory
requirements. For example, the law requires pre-suit letters in many
consumer-protection disputes 78 and actions to collect a debt.' 79  These
statutory requirements were enacted to encourage settlement and limit
damages,s yet little attempt has been made to incorporate negotiation theory
into these legally necessary demand letters.18'
Although the purpose behind requiring letters is pre-litigation settlement,182
these statutory requirements seem to contradict good negotiation practice in
several ways. First, on the most fundamental level, these laws almost certainly
172. FED. R. EVID. 408(a)(2) (stating that settlement communications are not admissible "to
prove liability for, [or] invalidity of' the claim or its amount); Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at
2020.
173. Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2020.
174. See Saks, supra note 10, at 802.
175. Id. at 801-02.
176. See id at 802.
177. Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2005 ("[Vlarious provisions of substantive law now
require, or make it otherwise desirable, that an initial letter or other document explaining the
plaintiff's legal and factual position be sent to the defendant as a prerequisite to filing suit.").
178. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(3) (West 2006); TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.505(a) (West 2002).
179. See Manuel H. Newburger, Acceleration Notices and Demand Letters, 47 CONSUMER
FIN. L. Q. REP. 338, 338-51 (1993) (discussing when and what kind of demand letters are
required in the debt-collection area).
180. See Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 322 N.E.2d 768, 779 (Mass. 1975). The court in
Slaney explained:
The demand letter serves a dual function. The first of these functions is to
encourage negotiation and settlement by notifying prospective defendants of claims
arising from allegedly unlawful conduct. This gives the addressee an opportunity to
review the facts and the law involved to see if the requested relief should be granted or
denied. The second function of the letter is to operate as a control on the amount of
damages which the complainant can ultimately recover if he proves his case.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
18 1. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
182. See Slaney, 322 N.E.2d at 779 (noting that demand letters are used to encourage
settlement).
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frame the negotiation as a one-time shot rather than a multistage process.,
Under the consumer-protection laws, for example, the claimant is required to
"reasonably identify the unfair or deceptive act or practice" and "the injury
suffered."' 4 The letter's recipient then has the option of tendering an offer of
settlement in writing.185 If the claimant rejects the offer and presses on with
litigation, the claimant's damages are limited to the amount of the tendered
offer if the offer was reasonable.186 The limitation on recovery is meant to
create an incentive for the plaintiff to settle at the first sign of a reasonable
offer because, at trial, the plaintiff may only receive the amount of the first
offer, and the plaintiff who takes his case to trial risks the uncertainty of not
receiving any payout at all.'87
One problem with these statutes requiring pre-litigation demand letters is
that the statutory language is not designed to follow the procedure of typical
legal negotiations, with stops and starts, offers, counter-offers, and re-
evaluations. 8 Another problem is that these consumer protection statutes
create a distributive negotiation frame in which the participants view the
outcome as zero-sum or a fixed-pie.' 89 The statutes generally limit a party's
recovery to money damages.190 For example, a plaintiff would have no
incentive to ask for non-monetary remedies or to coax the potential defendant
into cooperative negotiation if the initial letter would ultimately limit the
plaintiffs monetary recovery to the written demand presented in the first
demand letter. Therefore, even though parties with a consumer dispute could
avoid the statute's limitations altogether by negotiating a settlement that
considers compensation other than money, the required pre-litigation notice
seems to limit the lawyer's negotiation tools at the outset.
If the purpose of these legally required demand letters is to facilitate
settlement, there is no evidence that this additional pre-litigation requirement is
183. Cf MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 6, at
3-4 (discussing the myriad of skills and the general complexity of negotiation).
184. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(3).
185. Id.
186. Id. Of course, the definition of "reasonable" has been hard to pin down. Courts have
held that the reasonableness of a settlement offer under the Massachusetts statute is a question of
fact. See Kohl v. Silver Lake Motors, Inc., 343 N.E.2d 375, 378 (Mass. 1976).
187. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(3); Kohl, 343 N.E.2d at 380 (explaining the
parameters of § 9(3)).
188. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(3); see also Williams, supra note 40, at 33-35
(stating that there are multiple stages in legal negotiations).
189. See THE ESSENTIALS OF NEGOTIATION 48-50 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Press, Soc'y for
Human Res. Mgmt. 2005) ("In a distributive negotiation, the parties compete over the distribution
of a fixed sum of value.").
190. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(3). Requiring these types of demand letters
creates the same kind of bias Michael Moffitt identifies in the pleading requirements-they give
the perception that the "[p]roblems ... boil down to, 'Do you owe me money?.' Moffitt, supra
note 50, at 728.
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working.191 In fact, demand letters may actually hinder settlement and prolong
litigation, thwarting the intent of legislative schemes.1 92 If a demand letter can
actually hinder settlement, legislators would not necessarily be wise to require
them. Again, empirical study could inform about the most effective avenues to
bring about faster settlements and less-congested dockets, but that empirical
testing has not yet been conducted.
III. THE DEMAND LETTER AS A PRIMING DEVICE
By now, this Article should have convinced the reader that demand letters
cannot be ignored when developing and implementing a negotiation strategy.
These written negotiations set parties' initial impressions and spark their initial
emotions.193 They bring about certain psychological and emotional forces that
can either act as barriers to settlement or pave the road to favorable
negotiation. 194 Demand letters provide lawyers the opportunity to tell their
clients' stories in an integrated, persuasive narrative, and they are increasingly
required by law.195
These reasons alone should convince the legal profession to consider more
seriously the demand letter. But, if any research could convince lawyers that
the words they pen can have lasting consequences for future negotiations, it is
the research into the effects of priming. When a person's recent perceptions
incidentally and unknowingly influence his behavior, his behavior has been
"primed."196 For instance, when people play a word game that contains terms
"relevant to the elderly," like grey, old, wrinkle, and Florida, they walk more
slowly after finishing the word game than people who played a word game
with "age non-specific words" like birds, tree, and book. Unbeknownst to
the players with the first set of words, they were primed to conjure the
"elderly" stereotype. By unconsciously priming this stereotype, the players
behaved more like their perception of the stereotype, that is, they walked more
slowly.198
Because the written words used to convey a settlement demand likely
influence the recipient's subsequent behavior, the effects of priming on the
overall negotiation process should be carefully considered and empirically
191. See Korobkin & Guthrie, Opening Offers, supra note 47, at 3-4.
192. See id Although well-intentioned, statutes simply assume, without testing, that
requiring parties to make reasonable settlement offers from the outset will promote settlement.
The empirical evidence does not support this notion. See id.
193. See supra Part II.A.
194. See supra Part II.A.
195. See supra Part II.B.
196. See John A. Bargh et at., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Train
Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 230
(1996) [hereinafter Bargh et al., Automaticity ofSocial Behavior].
197. Id. at 236-37.
198. Id. at 237.
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studied. Although little research has been done on the effects of priming in
negotiations, the words lawyers use in a demand letter almost certainly have
some priming effect on their recipients.
Recall my neighbor's written demand that I change my parking habits. My
neighbor chose the written word to convey his message. He wanted me to
change my behavior; he wanted me to park farther away from his garage.
Having only written words in front of me, my emotions took control. I became
extremely angry, and the anger did not dissipate over the course of the day.
When I came home, I was still angry. My emotions controlled my reaction to
his demand.199 Instead of complying with his request, I was driven to seek
revenge despite my conscious awareness that revenge would probably be
counterproductive. I was amazed at my own reaction to my neighbor's written
demand, and I experienced, first hand, the power of the written word to ignite
emotions and to initiate and guide behaviors. My emotions flared, not because
I was offended by my neighbor's body language or intimidated by his size and
demeanor, but absent any personal contact. The written words drove my
subsequent behavior.
My experience with my neighbor is merely an anecdote. But my emotional
reaction and resulting uncooperative behavior conformed to the findings of
social psychologists who have researched the effects of priming on our
behavior and decision-making. 200
A. Priming Studies Demonstrate the Power of the Written Word to Influence
Behavior, Decision-Making, and Goal Setting
Somewhat recently, social psychologists began testing whether they could
automatically initiate certain behaviors in their subjects by priming them.201
These priming studies provide powerful evidence that written words drive
202
unconscious emotions and behaviors. The research challenges the notion
that people intentionally weiqh their options with careful contemplation before
choosing a course of action. 03 To the contrary, our behaviors do not result
199. Interestingly, my emotions also ignited my neighbors' emotions. They, too, became
vengeful even though the demand did not address them.
200. See, e.g., Dijksterhuis, supra note 51, at 246-55 (discussing the study "in which priming
the category of elderly led to changes in walking speed," thus demonstrating how priming can
have an impact on physical behavior); see also C. Neil Macrae et al., On Activating Exemplars,
34 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 330, 344 (1998) ("Despite the firm intuition that
behavior almost invariably has its origin in the intricate workings of the conscious mind, this
conviction turns out to rest on little more than a seductive illusion.").
201. Ferguson & Bargh, supra note 52, at 33. Although the bulk of the studies on priming
are recent, other researchers studied the effects of priming hostility on participants' behavior as
early as 1976, paving the way for the current studies. See John A. Bargh, Why We Thought We
Could Prime Social Behavior, 14 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 216, 218 (2003).
202. Ferguson & Bargh, supra note 52, at 33.
203. Id. at 34.
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solely from conscious thought.2 04 In fact, conscious thought is likely to result
205from unconscious processes.
Priming occurs when exposure to certain cognitive categories unconsciously
activates related categories of knowledge, or activates goal formation, which
more directly drives behavior.206 For example, people who watch a movie
about a mugger victimizing tourists in the city streets tend to interpret the act
of a stranger bumping into them later as hostile or aggressive.207 People who
view an Inspector Clouseau movie, however, tend to attribute the same act to
208the stranger's clumsiness. The movie primes a certain cognitive category
that becomes easily accessed later to interpret the stranger's act. 209 Similarly,
people exposed to a Formula One auto-racing champion's name, later, in an
ostensibly unrelated task, read a series of words faster;210 people exposed to a
picture of a "skinhead" display more racist attitudes; 211 and people exposed to
the scent of an all-purpose cleaner expended more effort to keep their area
clean when they ate. In the latter example, the prime-the scent of an all-
purpose cleaner-activated a schema with concepts related to cleaning; this
drove participants to behave in a way related to that concept, such as taking
care to keep themselves and the area around them clean. 213
Like a violent movie, the scent of cleaning solvent, or a famous racecar
driver's name, written words on a page also have a priming effect.214 In fact,
words on a page can automatically initiate complex behaviors in the reader-
from behaving more aggressively, to performing better on a test, to playing a
game more cooperatively-because the words prime certain related traits.21s
For example, an early study in priming demonstrated the power of words to
initiate either rude or polite behavior. The study used a scrambled sentence
204. Id
205. Dijksterhuis, supra note 51, at 258.
206. Ferguson & Bargh, supra note 52, at 34-36.
207. Steven L. Neuberg, Behavioral Implications of Information Presented Outside of
Conscious Awareness: The Effect of Subliminal Presentation of Trait Information on Behavior in
the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, 6 SOC. COGNITION 207, 208 (1988).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Macrae et al., supra note 200, at 345-46.
211. Kerry Kawakami et al., Effects of Social Category Priming on Personal Attitudes, 14
PSYCHOL. Sci. 315, 318 (2003).
212. Robert W. Holland et al., Smells Like Clean Spirit: Nonconscious Effects of Scent on
Cognition and Behavior, 16 PSYCHOL. SC. 689, 691 (2005).
213. Id at 691-92.
214. Id at 692. In fact, many priming studies involve the use of scrambled sentence
exercises or word-hunt games to prime participants. See Dijksterhuis, supra note 5 1, at 244-48
(discussing various behavioral priming studies to show that priming can utilize categories and
traits as primes); Stanchi, The Power ofPriming, supra note 60, at 1-8 (explaining that priming
can use sentence structure and word games).
215. Ferguson & Bargh, supra note 52, at 33-38.
216. Bargh et al., Automaticity ofSocial Behavior, supra note 196, at 233-34.
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exercise to prime the study's participants. 217  An experimenter gave study
participants a list of five words and asked them to write a complete sentence
using just four of the words.218 Some participants were given word groupings
with words relating to the trait "rude," such as bother, brazen, and
aggressively. 219 Those participants would take the words in a grouping such as
"they her bother see usually" and change them into a four-word sentence, such
as "they usually see her" or "they usually bother her." 220 Other participants
were given words related to the trait "polite."221 They would take the words in
a grouping such as "they her respect see usually" and change them to either
"they usually see her" or "they usually respect her."222 After completing the
exercise, participants left the lab to find the experimenter to receive directions
about the next part of the study.223 They found the experimenter engaged in
conversation and oblivious to their presence. 224 Participants who were primed
with the words relating to rude were about three times more likely to interrupt
the experimenter's ongoing conversation than participants who were primed
with words associated with polite.225 Of course, none of the participants were
217. Id.
218. Id. at 233.
219. Id. at 234 (noting that other examples include: "bold, rude, . . . disturb, intrude,
annoyingly, interrupt, audaciously, . . . impolitely, infringe, obnoxious, aggravating, and
bluntly").
220. JONATHAN HAIDT, THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS 13 (2006); Bargh et al., Automaticity
ofSocial Behavior, supra note 196, at 234.
221. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior, supra note 196, at 234 (explaining that
some of the critical stimuli included "respect, honor, considerate, . . . patiently, . . . polite, [and]
courteous").
222. Id
223. Id
224. Id
225. Id at 234-35. After removing those participants who did not interrupt at all from
consideration, it was apparent that over sixty percent of those primed with the construct "rude"
interrupted, between thirty and forty percent of those not primed with either "rude" or "polite"
interrupted, and only between ten and twenty percent of those primed with the construct "polite"
interrupted. Id Moreover, when the researchers designed the study, they did not anticipate the
significant effects of priming on the subjects' behavior. Bargh, supra note 201, at 216. The
researchers gave participants the same instructions: to complete the scrambled sentence test and,
when they had completed the test, to deliver the completed test to the test's administrator down
the hall before receiving further instructions. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior, supra
note 196, at 234. When the participants completed the sentence exercise and were ready to
receive further instructions, the test administrator was purposely involved in a conversation with a
colleague. Id. The colleague tracked the time between when the participant came into the hall
and when the participant interrupted the conversation in order to get further instructions. Id. To
their dismay, the researchers found that more than eighty percent of those who were primed with
the construct "polite" waited a full ten minutes without interrupting-a striking result considering
the study took place in New York City. Id. at 234-35. On the other hand, those primed with the
construct "rude" interrupted more frequently and much sooner. Id. at 234. The control group, not
primed with either word, interrupted more frequently and sooner than those primed with "polite"
words, yet waited longer to interrupt than those primed with "rude" words. Id. at 235.
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aware that they had been primed with words relating to the constructs "rude"
or "polite."226 They made no connection between the words in the scrambled
sentences and their later behavior.227
Priming research has gone far beyond the initial studies that use words to
prime simple behaviors. For example, researchers in the Netherlands have
primed mental performance.228 They demonstrated that when participants
simply wrote down their thoughts about professors before taking a general
knowledge test, they scored thirteen percent higher than those who wrote about
secretaries, and ten percent higher than those who did not write about
anything.229 On the other hand, participants who wrote about "soccer
hooligans" before taking the test scored eight percent lower than those who
were not asked to write anything.230 The test asked general knowledge-based
Trivial Pursuit questions, such as "Who painted La Guernica?" or "What is the
capital of Bangladesh?" 231  The questions had no obvious connection to
professors or soccer hooligans. One might think that a test taker either knows
or does not know the capital of Bangladesh. Amazingly, though, by priming
participants with the professor stereotype ("intelligence"), the researchers were
able to increase the participants' scores by sixteen percent over those primed
with the soccer hooligan stereotype ("stupidity").2 32 This priming changed the
participants' abilities to answer general-knowledge questions about what the
participants already knew, something usually seen as a highly controlled
behavior and fixed characteristic.233
In yet another study, researchers gave a group of2 articipants word-hunt
games containing words associated with achievement. 4 Those primed with
achievement words performed better on a later word-scramble game, and, in a
related study, were also much more likely to cheat by going past the time
allotted for the exercise than their counterparts who were not primed for
achievement. 235  Additionally, in a second related experiment, participants
226. Bargh et al., Automaticity ofSocial Behavior, supra note 196, at 234.
227. Id.
228. Ap Dijksterhuis & Ad van Knippenberg, The Relation Between Perception and
Behavior, or How to Win a Game of Trivial Pursuit, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 865,
867 (1998).
229. Id. at 869.
230. Id at 872 (comparing participants primed for nine minutes with those not primed at all).
231. Id at 869.
232. Id. at 871-72.
233. See id. at 874 ("Participants do not become more knowledgeable as a result of the prime
. . . . The effect must have come about because the prime triggered behaviors beneficial to
performance on a general knowledge task that already were part of the participants' behavioral
repertoire.").
234. John A. Bargh et al., The Automated Will: Nonconscious Activation and Pursuit of
Behavioral Goals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1014, 1016 (2001) [hereinafter Bargh et
al., The Automated Will].
235. Id at 1017, 1023.
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primed for achievement were more likely to persist with a word-scramble
problem than to switch to a more enjoyable exercise.236 And, finally, when
those in the achievement-primed group were interrupted while pursuing their
goal, they were not deterred; they were more likely to return to the task than
those who had not been primed.
Most significantly, researchers have demonstrated that people can be primed
to unconsciously pursue particular goals. 238  In one study, researchers
demonstrated that, when asked to first play a word-hunt game that contained
words relating to cooperation, participants who later played a scarce-resources
game played the game more cooperatively.239 Those who were not subject to
the first exercise did not act as cooperatively as their primed counterparts in the
second.240 A related study also showed that, when a person's goals are primed,
the priming effect increases until the goal is reached.241 Moreover, the goal
enforced through priming is not easily disrupted.24 2
Although few studies have attempted to link the effects of priming to legal
negotiations,243 a couple of studies are of particular importance to lawyers
crafting initial demands. An early study in priming demonstrated that
exposing participants to competitive words, even subliminally, led participants
to play a Prisoner's Dilemma Game more competitively. 24 The prime had
particularly strong effects on participants already predisposed to competitive
behavior.245  Therefore, demand letters delivered in a framework of
competition with competitive terms may likely cause already competitive
lawyers to intensify their aggressive behaviors.
On the other hand, lawyers who abandon competitive words for words that
invoke a sense of fairness may get better results. One study shows that sellers
can maintain their desired profits while increasing buyers' satisfaction by
priming the buyers to consider the fairness of the transaction.246 As noted
earlier, researchers have shown that people's perceptions of fairness can
236. Id. at 1023-24.
237. Id.
238. Dijksterhuis, supra note 5 1, at 248-51.
239. Bargh et al., The Automated Will, supra note 234, at 1017-18.
240. Id. at 1024.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See Dijksterhuis, supra note 51, at 252 (arguing that researchers in the area of decision-
making have been slow to incorporate the studies on automaticity and priming because they have
been influenced by economists' emphasis on rationality, blinded to the fact that people cannot
consciously weigh each alternative before making a choice because "this requires a degree of
introspection that people simply cannot achieve").
244. Neuberg, supra note 207, at 221.
245. Id
246. Sarah Maxwell et al., Less Pain, Same Gain: The Effects of Priming Fairness in Price
Negotiations, 16 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 545, 545, 561 (1999).
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influence negotiated outcomes.247 This is because fairness reflects a concern
for the group, rather than a single-minded concern for maximizing self-
interest.248
In the study, participants played the role of a used-car buyer.249 The buyers
were asked to negotiate a sales price for a particular car and researchers
provided them a description of the car for which they were bargaining,
including information about the selling price of cars with similar features.
The similar cars sold for prices ranging from $8,300 to $8,900.251 With this
information, half the participants were "asked to give the lowest and highest
252fair prices for the used car" before beginning their negotiations. Requiring
these participants to think about a fair price was intended to prime a concern
for fairness in their negotiation behavior.253 On the other hand, researchers
expected those not asked to give a range of fair prices to behave in a more self-
interested way during the price negotiation.254
The priming had significant effects on the bargaining process and the
buyers' satisfaction with the process.255 Although primed buyers did not make
significantly higher opening bids ($5,653) than the control group ($5,045),
they made larger concessions and moved the negotiations more quickly to
settlement.256 Although the primed group and the control group settled at
about the same price ($8,408 and $8,352, respectively), the primed buyers
reported that the settlement price exceeded their expectations and the control
257
group reported that it fell short of theirs. The primed group negotiated a
quicker settlement price, perceived the process as fairer, was more satisfied
with the outcome, and was more willing to negotiate with the seller in the
future.258
Priming may not be the panacea to significantly increase settlement values,
but this study shows that one can prime behavior essential to successful
negotiations. More collaborative negotiations most likely will prove less
costly and more satisfying.259 It also provides for the resolution of a greater
247. Id. at 548.
248. Id. at 549.
249. Id. at 554.
250. Id. at 554-55.
251. Id. at 555.
252. Id
253. Id at 550-51.
254. Id at 551.
255. Id at 558, tbl.1.
256. Id at 556-57.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 557-58.
259. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We Need a Mediator For?": Mediation's
"Value-Added"for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 1, 20-21 (1996); Maxwell et al.,
supra note 246, at 548 (noting that, in negotiations, coordinative behaviors rather than
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number of issues, "making the execution of any agreement reached[] more
likely."260 By priming group-oriented concerns, demand letters have the
potential of drawing another party into negotiations with more cooperative
behavior that will lead all the parties to a more satisfactory settlement.
Priming studies demonstrate that written words have the power to
unconsciously motivate behavior even in unrelated contexts and in ways of
261
which the reader is completely unaware. Recall my reaction to the note my
neighbor left on my car. Did the words on the page guide me to behave in a
way consistent with my perception of an "asshole"? There is certainly
evidence from social psychology that supports this conclusion. Because of the
powerful connection between written words, a person's behavior, and goal
262formation, we cannot continue to ignore written negotiation2. Priming
studies provide a compelling reason to delve more deeply into the possible
effects of the words we ink when we initiate negotiation through demand
letters.
B. What Behaviors Do Our Demand Letters Prime?
Analyzing the typical demand letter is difficult because not much is known
about the kinds of letters lawyers are writing.263 Lawyers have found a variety
of ways to initiate legal negotiations.264 Outside of a few statutory exceptions,265demand letters are not bound by any format. Procedural rules do not hinder
the parties' written negotiations. Furthermore, procedural rules often protect
these letters from public disclosure. 266
To understand what lawyers are writing, one can look to what lawyers may
have learned from legal-writing texts.267 Although many legal-writing texts
offer no advice on how to write a demand letter, some devote a few pages to
competitive behaviors "tend to expedite the negotiation process and increase the possibility of
mutual satisfactory win-win agreements").
260. See Paquin & Harvey, supra note 141, at 170.
261. See Dijksterhuis, supra note 51, at 246-55.
262. See id.
263. Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2020.
264. Id. at 1983.
265. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, §9(3) (West 2006) (providing substantive and
procedural requirements of a demand letter); see also LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING,
PROCESS, ANALYSIS & ORGANIZATION 245 n.5 (5th ed. 2010).
266. See FED. R. EVID. 408; see also Kerwin, supra note 171, at 668-69.
267. As this Article has already noted, legal-negotiation texts offer no advice on how to write
a demand letter. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., GERTRUDE BLOCK, EFFECTIVE
LEGAL WRITING FOR LAW STUDENTS & LAWYERS (5th ed. 1999); NORMAN BRAND & JOHN 0.
WHITE, LEGAL WRITING: THE STRATEGY OF PERSUASION (3d ed. 1994); VEDA R. CHARROW ET
AL., CLEAR AND EFFECTIVE LEGAL WRITING (4th ed. 2007); JOHN C. DERNBACH ET AL., A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL WRITING & LEGAL METHOD (3d ed. 2007); MICHAEL D. MURRAY
& CHRISTY H. DESANCTIS, LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING (2005); LAUREL CURRIE OATES &
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269
written negotiation. The advice offered, however, is untested and seemingly
contradictory, both to other legal-writing texts and to the methodologies now
used in the mediation and negotiation fields.270
Most legal-writing books that mention demand letters offer advice on
strategy, substance, and style.271 Authors claim that the demand letter ought to
be concise,272 with an accurate and realistic recitation of the facts, coupled with
a specific demand and a specific deadline for compliance. 273 Authors focus on
the effects a demand letter will have on its reader. They advise about the
letter's tone, warning that the letter may have many audiences, including the
274judge overseeing the litigation. Aside from instructing lawyers to "look at
ANNE ENQUIST, THE LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK: ANALYSIS, RESEARCH, AND WRITING (4th
ed. 2006).
269. See, e.g., CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND WRITING 521-35 (5th ed.
2006) (explaining how to write a demand letter); EDWARDS, supra note 265, at 245-46
(discussing demand letters and responses); BRYAN A. GARNER, THE REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON
LEGAL STYLE 367-73 (2d ed. 2006) (providing examples of well-written demand letters);
NEUMANN, supra note 56, at 273-78 (discussing the strategy and structure of persuasive demand
letters); AUSTEN L. PARRISH & DENNIS T. YOKOYAMA, EFFECTIVE LAWYERING: A CHECKLIST
APPROACH TO LEGAL WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT 89-91 (2007) (offering guidelines for
writing an effective demand letter); MARY BARNARD RAY & BARBARA J. Cox, BEYOND THE
BASICS: A TEXT FOR ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING 334-47 (1991) (discussing how to effectively
engage in written negotiation); HELENE S. SHAPO ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW
246-50 (5th ed. 2008) (laying out the sections of a demand letter); JUDITH M. STINSON, THE TAO
OF LEGAL WRITING 16 (2009) (explaining three ways to persuade in demand letters).
270. See Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion, supra note 103, at 412 n.3 ("[T]he concept of
integrating techniques gleaned from social science into legal writing is relatively new and largely
unexplored."); supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
271. See infra note 275.
272. See EDWARDS, supra note 265, at 245-46 (recommending a cursory demand letter if
settlement seems unlikely); NEUMANN, supra note 56, at 277 ("[U]se the minimum number of
words needed to get the point across."); PARRISH & YOKOYAMA, supra note 269, at 90 (advising
lawyers to write demand letters "succinctly").
273. See GARNER, supra note 269, at 368 (explaining that the lawyer should include in a
demand letter the client's perspective and demand, among other detailed information);
NEUMANN, supra note 56, at 276, 278 ("[T]he demand should be precise. Say exactly what the
consequences should be."); PARRISH & YOKOYAMA, supra note 269, at 90 (advising the lawyer
to specify the amount of money the client is seeking and the exact action he wishes the opposing
party to take); STINSON, supra note 269 (noting that the demand letter should "include[] the most
basic facts").
274. GARNER, supra note 269, at 368 (noting that a demand letter could become an exhibit in
litigation); NEUMANN, supra note 56, at 273-74 (stating that there are three to four audiences to a
demand letter); PARRISH & YOKOYAMA, supra note 269, at 89 (noting that a judge may read the
demand letter). This advice is curious because, if the writers are trying to settle the case, there is
no reason for them to be posturing for the litigation that may follow. Do authors focus on the
judge as audience because the authors have little faith that a demand letter can work? Is it
because they view interactions between lawyers or parties as likely to be hostile and
unprofessional, conduct that would eventually embarrass the lawyer if the judge was witness?
This advice seems to lack faith in the power of demand letters to foster settlement.
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things from the reader's point of view," 275 these writing texts fail to
incorporate the rich and abundant research from the mediation and negotiation
arena.276 In fact, the authors seem to teach lawyers to write letters in a way
completely disconnected from the foundational principles that drive the best
negotiated settlements. The letters discussed in these legal-writing texts fail to
contemplate collaborative bargaining and, instead, adopt the language of
277
competitive, zero-sum negotiation.
For example, Bryan Garner proclaims that the demand letter "should attempt
to goad the adversary to capitulate" and "should convey the threat of litigation
and its attendant costs and headaches." 278 Garner defines a good demand letter
as one with "a threatening tone yet with a sensible suggestion for resolving the
dispute."279 Another author advises lawyers to write a letter that will "make
the other side afraid of something." 280  Still another author writes that the
"most persuasive style in a demand letter is one that the reader does not notice,
one that focuses the reader's attention on your demands, justifications, and
threats." 281
Although adopting the language of threats and fear, the authors of these
writing texts seem to understand, without articulation, some accepted
principles about negotiation. They advise that a demand letter goes too far if
it inflames the recipient or backs the recipient into a corner.28 They wa
lawyers not to bully284 or to deeply offend, ' and counsel them to use threats
as a last resort286 and appear cooperative as long as compromise is still
possible.287 However, this advice, unattached to any explicit theories of
negotiation, conflicts with the general principles of negotiation theories, which
advise negotiators to avoid threats, blame, and shame; to view the negotiation
275. See NEUMANN, supra note 56, at 274; see also GARNER, supra note 269, at 367 ("[Y]ou
must get inside the recipient's head to understand what type of approach will succeed.").
276. See Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion, supra note 103, at 413 (arguing that current
information on persuasive legal writing fails to recognize the "growing body of research from
other disciplines that would provide some evidence about whether the conventional wisdom is an
accurate account of human decisionmaking [sic]").
277. See, e.g., CALLEROS, supra note 269, at 526-27 (recommending that a lawyer engage in
competitive behavior by never conceding a weaker claim in a demand letter, but not mentioning
anything about the benefits of collective bargaining).
278. GARNER, supra note 269, at 367.
279. Id at 370.
280. NEUMANN, supra note 56, at 277.
281. CALLEROS, supro note 269, at 523.
282. See Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion, supra note 103, at 415 ("Persuasive legal
writers may not be familiar with the psychological term 'priming,' but much of the conventional
wisdom of legal writing incorporates the concept.").
283. GARNER, supra note 269, at 367-68.
284. Id. at 368; NEUMANN, supra note 56, at 275.
285. NEUMANN, supra note 56, at 274.
286. RAY & COX, supra note 269, at 343.
287. SHAPO ET AL., supra note 269, at 347.
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as a collaborative rather than a competitive process; to avoid focusing on zero-
sum solutions; and to frame the negotiation as a win-win proposition.288 The
authors of legal-writing texts seem to be saying that a minor threat may be
necessary, but they caution lawyers not to go overboard. There is no
discussion of why a party should make a specific rather than a general demand
with a specific rather than an open-ended deadline. And the advice seems to
assume that the letter's recipient is a completely rational actor who can be
persuaded by strong, logical arguments. 9 Of course, the research in
negotiation theory contradicts these untested assumptions. 290
Because texts on negotiation fail to cover the demand letter, lawyers seeking
advice on how to start negotiations in writing can only turn to common
practice or legal-writing texts. But the practitioners and writing experts may
be getting it wrong. 291 If the empirical research in negotiation behavior and
priming is right, these model demand letters may cause protracted disputes and
less favorable settlements. On the other hand, advice that incorporates the rich,
cross-disciplinary research of legal-negotiation theory could dramatically
change the course of negotiations.
IV. CONCLUSION: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND THE WRITTEN DEMAND
The empirical evidence strongly suggests that written demand letters affect
their readers far beyond the intentions of the lawyers who write them. By
following the traditional advice on demand letters, attorneys could be priming
their adversaries for a long, competitive, hostile negotiation process. Empirical
research, however, may assist lawyers to write demand letters that would
appeal to the other side's values, focus on the other side's gains, and offer an
invitation to negotiate in an atmosphere where infinite solutions are available.
Moreover, lawyers would probably serve their clients better by priming
cooperation, fairness, and empathy. Rather than creating a fixed-pie bias from
the outset, lawyers could prime creative thinking about interest-based
solutions.
By integrating interdisciplinary research into the written demand, lawyers
292
can more effectively and efficiently resolve disputes. With written demand
288. See DEAN G. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 22 (1981) ("Bargainers usually assume
that they can compel the other to concede by the use of persuasive arguments, threats, delays and
other competitive tactics[, but the] use of such tactics is ordinarily costly . . . [and] such costs are
not worth the candle.").
289. See CALLEROS, supra note 269, at 523; NEUMANN, supra note 56, at 274-77.
290. See Moffitt, supra note 50, at 739-40.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 282-90.
292. Glenn & Susskind, supra note 7, at 118 (arguing for better negotiation training because
the critical movements in a negotiation often happen quickly, with little time for reflection);
Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion, supra note 103, at 413 ("Advocacy is most effective when
the lawyer has the tools to make deliberate, conscious decisions about the persuasive device to
employ and how and when to employ it.").
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letters, lawyers have more control over their written product. With face-to-
face negotiations, people often behave unpredictably and emotions can flare.293
Lawyers are often advised to "go to the balcony," or to remove themselves so
that decisions are not driven solely by their emotions.294 With the demand
letter, lawyers can put their carefully crafted negotiation strategies to work
with less fear that their emotions will thwart their well-made plans.295 Second,
demand letters may have long-lasting positive effects on the recipient if a
lawyer can effectively prime the recipient's goal formation.296 Finally,
demand letters often provide opposing parties with their first impressions of
the factual and legal claims.297 By focusing on the client's narrative early in
the process, a client's lawyer may gain the client's trust while also creating a
better opportunity to settle the case favorably.298
Michael Saks proclaimed in an article about trial tactics, "[s]ooner or later,
litigators and scholars of advocacy will come along who really want to know
what works, and they will begin systematic empirical testing of various tactics
and techniques."299 If lawyers are to accomplish better and more efficient
settlements, they must investigate what happened before the first face-to-face
negotiation or the first court-ordered mediation. They must understand what
sets the parties' framework for negotiations, what behaviors and goals have
been primed, and what emotions have been ignited before the parties begin
their personal interactions. By the time the parties meet face-to-face, their
emotions and positions may be too hostile and fixed to overcome.
Important legal negotiations start with written demand letters. The
principles and practices that work in face-to-face negotiation may help lawyers
craft demand letters that facilitate settlement. However, lawyers have not often
asked whether their techniques are empirically sound. Instead, lawyers have
relied on methods derived from intuition and tradition. 300 Only by empirically
testing methods can lawyers know whether they are helping or hindering
negotiated settlements.301  The time has come to engage in this most
293. WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST No 32-33 (1991).
294. Id. at 37-39.
295. A lawyer writing a demand letter may have more control over her emotions before she
sends the final product to the recipient because she would have time to reflect and revise without
the pressures of an emotionally charged environment. This assumes something that has not been
tested, however.
296. See Dijksterhuis, supra note 51, at 248-52.
297. See Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2002-03.
298. See id at 2008.
299. Michael J. Saks, Flying Blind in the Courtroom: Tying Cases Without Knowing What
Works and Why, 101 YALE L. J. 1177, 1191 (1992).
300. Stanchi, The Science ofPersuasion, supra note 103, at 412 ("[T]he study of persuasive
writing has been dominated by a kind of 'armchair psychology'-a set of conventions and
practices handed down from lawyer to lawyer, developed largely from instinct and speculation.").
301. Saks, supra note 10, at 802 ("Effective answers about 'what works' will come not from
reflection or intuition but from empirical inquiries: from concrete experience, from experimental
[Vol. 60:107142
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fundamental research so that what we teach lawyers and law students coincides
with what actually persuades.
tests of alternative techniques, and perhaps from borrowing findings about phenomena of
persuasion from disciplines that study persuasion empirically.").
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